Rhetorical Analysis of Isocrates' Areopagiticus

For the Children

Isocrates, in his Areopagiticus, seeks to influence deliberation on issues in political realms; specifically, the manner in which officials are elected and held accountable in Athens.  After illuminating the problems in Athenian politics, Isocrates smoothly transitions to the core of the problem, hiring the common topic of conjecture to accentuate the calamitous and deplorable nature of administrative policy and behavior in the immediate past, along with the employment of the common topic of degree in conjunction with the sophistic topic of contrast to compare the quality of the Athenian administration in the past as opposed to that of the present day. He stresses the fact that he is not a proponent of oligarchy; he simply advocates stricter criterion for the election of public officials. Isocrates leads his audience through the logical progression of time, prompting his audience to fill in various commonplaces, such as the imperative to leave a virtuous legacy, to fill out his pervasive enthymemes. Isocrates attacks the stasis issue on the translative level; “make your choice between the two constitutions” (Isocrates 5).  He uses a barrage of the common topics of both degree and conjecture to arrive at his purpose:  the advocacy of the reinstitution of the former constitution, along with an accounting of the actions of the present government, an objective that attempts to subdue a rhetorical quarry that occupies the deliberative genre of rhetoric.

While there are evidently political problems in Athens at this time in its history, it is also clear that Isocrates had to establish his right and reason to be heard before he presented his argument: “from accurate knowledge, it is your duty to give an earnest attention to what I say”(5).  This is indicative of the stiff opposition he may have been facing during the delivery of this piece of rhetoric.  Isocrates himself is heavily responsible for the illumination and presentation of the kairos, which is the sorry state of the Athenian political system. He devotes a sizeable chunk of parchment endeavoring to convince his audience that, although "we might reasonably be of good courage as being out of reach of danger" (1), there are, in all actuality, serious problems in Athens, hence the kairotic moment for his rhetoric. Since Isocrates bears the responsibility of illuminating the troubles of Athens as he speaks to his audience, he has a certain power over his audience: he has had a head start in his endeavor to conquer the issue.  While the audience is only just discovering the gravity of the problem, Isocrates has already found the solution. Urgency bleeds from his enthymemes, seeking the induction of the audience to mentally implore him for the answers. In this way, he is not only the rhetor, but the deliverer.  

Isocrates’ enthymemes progress through Areopagiticus, as if starting from a tiny mountain spring and slowly gathering more juice for his logical current as enthymemes gather more speed due to feeder premises, and finally lead to the Amazon of Isocrates’ rhetorical target. Shortly into Areopagiticus, Isocrates introduces the problem he wishes to combat in enthymemic form: the most prosperous and confident cities “adopt the worst counsels…fall into the greatest dangers” (2).  The implied premise inserted hypothetically by hearers of Isocrates is applied: “Athens is both prosperous and confident,” which leads to “Athens will adopt poor counsel and fall into the greatest dangers.”  This enthymeme is based upon common topics of both degree, due to the element of the greatest dangers, and conjecture, as is evidenced by the past fact that cities have behaved in this manner in the past and suffered ominous consequences.  

Isocrates details a short history of Athens, specifically the administration that had worked under the former constitution that he is advocating in this piece of rhetoric, the constitution of the Council of Areopagus.  Paragraphs 4-15 in Areopagiticus are percolating with the common topic of conjecture, documenting the prosperity during the time of the Council of Areopagus, and drawing non-parallel lines between the former council and the deplorable behavior exhibited by the council-members at the present time:

The young men did not pass their time in gambling-houses, the company of female flute-players, or in society such as that in which they now spend their days, but kept to the manners in which they had been trained, respecting and striving to emulate those who were distinguished for their adherence to them (13).

This sophistic topic of compare and contrast not only harmonizes with the common topic of conjecture, but the common topic of degree simultaneously in successful amalgamation.  The men of the council in the former times are shown to have been of far superior moral fiber than those of the present time.  Furthermore, this display plays on a commonplace of the audience; the commonplace of legacy, and the responsibility that goes with that legacy.

Isocrates steeps his’ Areopagiticus in the commonplace idea that legacy is something to be revered.  There is a universal responsibility to:  not only honor ancestors through the stewardship of what they have passed down, but to leave a favorable world behind for one’s descendants.  This much is commonplace to Isocrates’ audience, and they are thus prompted to subscribe to Isocrates’ notion that Athenian principals are being compromised to the current administrative system.

    This phenomenon is also put into enthymemic form, although it is spread amid a slew of other complimentary ideas. The first premise is the one implicated rather than stated, as it is a commonplace:  
A legacy of virtuous living and prosperity is of the utmost importance.
The Council of Areopagus, under the former constitution, propagated virtuous living and prosperity, and bequeathed this legacy to their ancestors.
Therefore, resuscitation of the former constitution is of the utmost importance.  

Isocrates uses the analogy of the body politic to illustrate the importance of having virtuous men in office.  “For a city’s soul is nothing else but its political principle, which has as great influence as understanding in a man’s body” (4).  He documents the desirable characteristics for the “head(s)” of state and occasions an integrity pool in which to find such characteristics:  “For our ancestors paid such attention to virtue that they charged the Council of Areopagus…only those were admitted who were of noble birth, and who had shown distinguished virtue and sobriety” (10).  Juxtaposed with the current administration, the former appeared heavenly in contrast, which argument falls into line with the common topic of both degree and conjecture that once again surfaces to reinforce Isocrates’ argument.  Isocrates furthermore displays a psychological ability to predict his audience’s misgivings, and is careful to be plain that he is not proposing an oligarchy:  “I strongly object to oligarchies and privileges, and approve of equal rights and democracies,--not, however, of all, but of such principles of justice and reason” (16).          

Continued dalliances into both the past and present condition of Athenian politics ostensibly suggest that Isocrates is attempting to either castigate present political figures or defend past ones. Isocrates does spend considerable time censuring the present holders of political office. His stance toward present officials is far from coddling, and he subsequently loiters around the epideictic genre of rhetoric, citing the current administration’s lack of discipline, delivering an implied imperative to his tribunal audience: “praise is due to those who show themselves worthy of the virtue of their ancestors, blame to those who disgrace their noble birth by their own laziness or vice” (15).  Isocrates also delivers a nimbus of forensic evidence considering the justice of the Council of Areopagus, writing of their nobility in both in fact and deed. However, these are simply provisionary phases passed through en route to the salient query: in what state should we hand Athens down "to leave as a legacy for our children?"(2). This question can only be answered and fulfilled in the future tense, painting it as deliberative rhetoric, to be realized as philosophy for the future benefit of Athens.

Isocrates delivers a rhetorical masterpiece fortified with a collage of concurrent rhetorical doohickeys in unity to result in a message designed to be transformative in his audience.  Isocrates does not immediately blurt out his rhetorical purpose, but predominately uses a circumspect painting of the outline of his purpose, trusting the commonplaces held by his audience to connect the dots.  This way, his argument is less imposing, and he gives the allusion that he is demanding less of his audience.  The glaring differences between the administrations of the Council of Areopagus and that of the present are inescapable as told by Isocrates, so that he barely has to mention his purpose of reinstating the former constitution. At that point, he only has to tip one rhetorical domino, and he can sit back and watch his audience’s former presuppositions topple.